This post comes from this link. I didn’t have anything to add; I just wanted to point it out.
Pew Research Center recently asked a national sample of adults to select among a list of 10 skills: “Regardless of whether or not you think these skills are good to have, which ones do you think are most important for children to get ahead in the world today?”
The answer was clear. Across the board, more respondents said communication skills were most important, followed by reading, math, teamwork, writing and logic. Science fell somewhere in the middle, with more than half of Americans saying it was important.
Rounding out the bottom were skills more associated with kids’ extracurricular activities: art, music (sorry, right-brained people) and athletics. There was virtually no difference in the responses based on whether the person was a parent of a child aged 18 and younger or not.
Earlier I described why there’s a need for making language therapy more objective. Now I’ll specifically describe how this can be done.
- Check the deficits on the present levels and goals/objectives – They should be the same as from the most recent evaluation minus goals achieved since that evaluation.
- Keep referring to those deficits/goals – Make a list to put at the top of each data page, or the inside of speech folder – IEP goals can be copied, but make sure they reflect the present levels
- Take good notes – good notes help you as much as anyone else
- Be objective not subjective with your notes – Objective language data must have 3 things:
- Level of words – There are big time differences developmentally within classes of words. You may work on basic words or later developing words, but not at the same time with the same kid. For example, for a kid working on conjunctions, and and or should not be worked on at the same time as although and unless. You probably need a comprehensive list.
- Task type – Some tasks are easier; some are harder. To differentiate tasks, I use ID/Label/Use (ID is easiest, Use is hardest).
- ID tasks – Often involve pictures or objects and/or choices with foils – Easier tasks have fewer foils generally, with more foils making it harder with IDing objects in environment or in scenes being the most difficult, as they have tons of possible incorrect answers. Other tasks: “Wrong or Right,” and “Find It”
- Label – Can be spontaneous labeling (The kid just labels something as soon as he sees it); direct elicitation (What is ____?); choices (Is this a _____ or ______?); or fill in the blank (The giraffe is ____.), labeling from attributes, labeling category members
- Use – Can be using in a sentence (Use the word “fell” in a sentence); repair (Fix this sentence: “He are running.”), finishing sentence (Finish this sentence with the word “not:” “He did _____.”); describing; sentence repetition
- Cueing – Be consistent. This system seems prevalent: min (cueing required some of the time, generally less than 25%); mod (cueing required approximately half of the time or about 25 to 75%); and max (cueing required most or all of the time or greater than about 75%).
- Tons of great activities combine task types. Tons of great activities can’t be measured – Books, play activities, theme based activities, crafts, etc. These are all great to do, especially considering the tremendous motivational value from varying teaching techniques. However, you can’t perform objective measurements with combined tasks. Not all therapy should be objective, though – we know that best practice is to do baselines, and criterion referenced short “quizzes” to measure progress, and then devote much of therapy time to teaching, or activities that reinforce or integrate different skills.
The following scenario is completely made up, but in a way that should be familiar to a lot of speech-language pathologists (SLPs). Miraka has been working on time concepts for, well, a long time. You, as the therapist, have worked on asking her questions like what she did yesterday, when she eats lunch, and maybe even differentiating between hours and minutes. Perhaps you’ve worked with staff implementing routines and visual cues so that Miraka can anticipate what’s coming next in her school day. You seem to be doing some good stuff, but you’re just not sure Miraka’s making progress, and you’re not even sure exactly how to tell when her goal’s been met. People ask how Miraka’s doing, and we say things like, “She’s working hard. It seems like you can understand her better,” or “Her sentences seem better.” Inside we squirm because we can’t be more precise.
I’ll just state it bluntly: a lot of SLPs do not like language therapy. It’s just not as neat and straightforward as, say, articulation therapy, where you know exactly where the kid’s at, and exactly where the kid’s supposed to be going. The practice of language therapy has often been messy, or more of an art than science. And though we don’t like to admit it, we tend to measure language progress more from the gut than from any chart. We go almost entirely by subjective measures, such as how we feel, and what others are reporting. We can’t quantify Miraka’s progress, and this makes us uneasy.
In my many years of assessing many kids, so many of whom were three or under, I’ve often noted how different kids are in their abilities to play. I’ve also been motivated by the Preschool Language Scale’s differentiation of play, generally into functional and relational play – though I feel this great start can be expanded.
How a child plays tells us so much about that child, especially with children that are difficult to assess in traditional manners, because of compliance or a low level of function. Not only that, but an accurate assessment of what level a child is playing at can help guide intervention and suggestions for caregivers. Play can be an excellent method for developing other communication skills, such as initiation, imitation, and turn taking. I came up with a list of these levels that I’ve started using in my own assessment, and thought it would be helpful to share that here. It generally goes from a lower developmental level to higher, although there is much overlap.
1) Shaking/banging objects in play
2) Smiling or laughing at or along with others
3) Attending to others who are singing, dancing, or reading
4) Examining novel objects
3) Anticipation – Does the child demonstrate sensing when something is going to happen, such as an object about to fall off a table, block tower about to fall, or a pretend plane taking off?
4) Functional play – Does the child use play objects appropriately, such as bouncing balls, driving cars, etc.?
5) Relational play – Involves using two objects together, such as pretending to pour juice for a play picnic, or having a figure ride in a car or on a horse.
6) Other directed play – Does the child watch others for reactions, or imitate play behaviors, with some basic turn taking?
7) Representative play – Involves pretending like something is something else, such as pretending a pencil is a rocket, or a block is an ice cube.
One reason why describing language as a third reality can be helpful, is that it can reduce linguistic confusion. A lack of realization of belief’s influence on language frequently leads to confusion. Whenever you comprehend the words of another you are always doing so through the filter of their beliefs. You can never remove this filter, though you can take steps to remove the distortions of its influence.
A gap seems to exist between our understanding of language and our potential to understand language, particularly for large swathes of people isolated and intimidated by the manner in which language is currently explained. Additionally, a greater realization that language is a way of depicting our beliefs rather than reality itself seems to lend itself to a potential of resolution of conflicts more due to differing definitions and concepts than people currently realize. My choice in words is not affected by truth as much as I would like to believe, but rather by my belief in the words’ correspondence to reality.
Perhaps the lesser-haired man was wanting to climb the mountain, but after hearing of it’s description, he changed his mind. Some obvious means exist of clearing this confusion, such as the asking for more detail, and the seeking out of other sources. There are other ways too, but they all share the quality of first realizing the risk of equating words with reality rather than belief.
Concepts could be thought of as being utilitarian by nature. They are also subject to a sort of natural selection. These concepts exist, and ultimately persist or fade, based upon how well they serve us. Democracy, as one example, is nothing more than an idea, melded together of other ideas, such as, that leaders should be chosen based upon the will of the people those leaders serve. This one concept, though, draws upon, and lends characteristics to a multitude of other beliefs and concepts. That people vote is only one of a vast number of these potential characteristics. As is how they vote, and who exactly gets to do so – and what is an election, and a campaign, and how does campaign finance reform play into this? And what are the characteristics of a dual party system versus a multi-party system? You could list examples of good democracies, and you could even list examples of bad monarchies which led to revolutions, which led to the good democracies. Why doesn’t everybody automatically advocate democracy? What is the role of the media? What is a hanging chad? Continue reading →
A Rudimentary Description
Everything that physically exists is a part of reality. These are the things that we can see, touch, smell, think about, or talk about, as well as the things that remain hidden from our senses. There are things that physically exist regardless of whether or not any sentient being can sense them. The ink on this page and the arranged electrons on my computer screen exist in this reality.
What can then be considered (by minds) as a second realm of reality is a subset of the complete reality – that first reality. What exists within this second reality is real too, but only in brains. These are the physical manifestations of belief – neurons and neuronal connections, themselves comprised of brain matter. These are labeled with words such as thoughts, memories, feelings, perceptions, and attitudes. These are how our brains perceive everything in the first reality, order these perceptions, interject them with emotions, instincts, and categories so as to interpret the world primarily to predict the best future courses of action. Most animals have these beliefs because most animals have choices. Beliefs inform choices, the results of which cyclically shape belief.
The constituents of language, then, can be considered a third reality. All language exists in the first reality as ink on a paper, or electrons on a screen, or sound waves created by vocal cords. Crucially, though, all language also must exist in the second reality. All language depends upon prior belief, which itself depends upon prior reality.
Conversely much of reality exists without belief, and much of belief exists without language, including all belief outside of people – i.e., animals.
Richard Rorty, who passed away in 2007 at the age of 75, had a lot to say on philosophy, knowledge, and language, some of which I was happy to recently rediscover.
As philosophers so often are, he was known primarily for his dissection of the work of other philosophers; in this case his criticism of analytic philosophy, as exemplified in his 1979 book, “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.”
Rorty embraced the American pragmatism of Dewey, Peirce, and James in attacking the analytics’ persistent attempts to nail down an eternally exact description of truth and knowledge. “Truth is not out there,” he said – at least a truth separate from our own beliefs and language.
Rorty wrote of the contingency of language; that truth is determined by human agreement using roughly equivalent language. Truth can not exist independently of the human created vocabularies used to desribe it, and so truth is not possible in the world beyond the human mind. Rorty believed that the world does not speak. Only people do.
Because much of his work upset the dogmas of mainstream philosophy, and because of Rorty’s controversial divergenge into writing about politics, the importance of all his work seems to have been stifled from the main stream. Which is a shame.
I posted the following in 2008:
Although linguist Daniel Everett has been studying the Pirahã (pronounce pee-da-ha) Amazonian tribe, and their unique language since the 1970’s, his work remained relatively obscure until 2005, when an article he’d published on his website was then published in Cultural Anthropology. According to Everett’s studies, the Pirahã’s language lacks many aspects of language that linguists argue are basic necessities of a universal grammar, such as color concepts, perfect tense, quantity concepts, and numbers over two. Why? According to Everett, their hunter-gatherer lifestyles have such little use for these concepts, that words to convey them simply don’t exist. This research, which overtly repudiates the Chomskyian theory that has dominated the study of language for decades, has been called by Steven Pinker, “A bomb thrown into the party.”
Update: The debate caused by Everett’s studies of the Pirahã , and the continuance of this debate is fascinating. Those supporting universal grammar seem hung up on attacking Everett’s methodology, which are offered up as evidence that his conclusions are false. Interestingly, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was practically discarded for years because of Benjamin Whorf’s misleading claims about the number of words Inuit Eskimos had for snow. It should be noted that it has been far from proven that Everett’s methods actually were problematic. Meanwhile, the consensus appears to be favoring the truth as lying somewhere between linguistic relativism, or what is sometimes called the strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and claims that all of language is determined by structures born into our brains.
Everett’s quote from this story excellently sums up what I think is closest to the truth:
“The lesson is that language is not something mysterious that is outside the bounds of natural selection, or just popped into being through some mutated gene. But that language is a human invention to solve a human problem. Other creatures can’t use it for the same reason they can’t use a shovel: it was invented by humans, for humans and its success is judged by humans.”
An aspect so often ignored with language is that what works is much more important than how it works. If you have a dinner guest who asks where the silverware is located, you may truthfully reply, ˝In the drawer.˝ This may be technically true, but if there are three drawers, and your guest checks the closest drawer when you meant the farthest drawer, your answer was not as useful as it could have been. Simply put, correspondence to reality is a better goal for language than truth.
This point becomes really pivotal then: anytime someone asks, “What does________ mean?” an answer that includes what people believe will always be closer to reality than an answer that excludes people. For example:
- What is truth? Truth is a word that people use to describe when almost all people agree on something.
- What is freedom? Freedom is a word that people use to describe the extent of multiplicity of options an organism generally has.
- What is genius? Genius is a word that people use to describe when a person creates ideas or things that most people later agree to be valuable.
It’s certainly more concise and better sounding to leave out the part regarding people’s beliefs, which causes people then to go ahead and leave it out. But just realize then that if you do omit the part having to do with people, your definition will be at least a bit farther from reality than the more inclusive definition.
So, on one level language is not very complicated as exemplified by the fact that young children use it very effectively. But, because language can describe anything we want it to, it’s description can become dizzyingly complex. Just consider this example of a “short” list of concepts that are words used only to describe various aspects of language:
All of these different ways of describing language become extremely problematic when someone attempts to learn about language. It seems overwhelming, to say the least. There are so many people, such as teachers, and lawyers, and philosophers, and salespeople, and on and on, who sense a need to learn about language, but then start coming across these terms, and give up, thinking the task obviously too difficult. A person can learn more about language by learning about all of these areas, but that person doesn’t have to.
I’ve recently re-read this article from October’s Discover magazine, an extremely interesting read concerning genetic influences on developmental delays. It was interesting enough that I wanted to comment on it here. Unfortunately, the article is behind a pay wall, so I’ll first summarize a few of the more intriguing points, and then follow up with my comments.
The author, Mark Cohen, a developmental pediatrician, specifically describes comparisons between the developmental problems of a boy with velocardiofacial syndrome (VCF) and another boy with DiGeorge syndrome. The boy with VCF was brought to Cohen’s clinic at the age of 2½ before the mother knew that he had VCF. The child had begun demonstrating moderately severe delays with speech, language, and learning generally, and she didn’t know why. Cohen was able to diagnose the boy’s VCF by using additional medical information that does normally require a trained individual to diagnose. This diagnosis was later confirmed by genetic testing. The mother was not only relieved to discover that her son’s problems were not her fault, it was now possible to more adequately devise a future plan of treatment.
This all got Cohen to thinking – and specifically, remembering a boy he’d once treated who had DiGeorge Syndrome, a much more serious disorder that usually presents with multiple medical issues and more severe mental retardation. He got to thinking about it because both VCF and DiGeorge Syndrome are caused by chromosomal deletions occurring on the exact same chromosome location. In fact both of these syndromes are referred to as 22q11.2 deletion syndrome, despite that the patterns of abnormalities they present with are often quite different. The two syndromes have very similar causes, but result in far different outcomes, only because in the severe syndrome slightly more genetic material is missing. DiGeorge Syndrome has historically been far easier to diagnose however while VCF has not.
The implication here is that there must be countless other cases similar to this first boy’s with now diagnosable genetic conditions, which are going undiagnosed. Anybody who works in special education knows that some children just respond well to a certain amount of extra help that other children just don’t respond as well to. There are so many children that we just don’t know exactly what’s going on. Without adequate information, conjecture must often take a more overly predominant role in therapy planning. Sometimes teachers suspect that the root of a child’s issues are occurring because of that child’s home life, while other times members of the planning team know that something unidentifiable is amiss. When I was in graduate school many years ago, we were taught the phrase “FLK” for “funny looking kid,” which while definitely not politically correct, at least underscores the issue here. These were children that everybody suspected had genetic causes to their developmental delays that were just impossible to know for certain.
Times have changed dramatically in our abilities to now figure these things out. However, in the United States, at least, the cost continues to prohibit. This New York Times article does a great job of spelling out the issue – basically, companies that perform these tests are extremely vigilant in patenting, reducing competition so that they can charge whatever they want. These companies do point to what they consider comparably high costs elsewhere, especially Europe, and there are definitely other factors that muddle this, such as overall infrequency of testing, and labor intensiveness, which also work to drive up the costs. The bottom line, though, is that for people of monetary means, this testing can provide extremely valuable information unavailable to people with less disposable income – and that includes children. And it seems as though there are solutions that can drive down the cost of genetic testing, such as having governments essentially buy the patent, opening up the market for competition. It will be interesting to see how this plays out as yet another possible instance (such as the convergence of mass media, campaign finance, U.S. health care, Wall Street, etc.) of one group’s money interests conflicting with what seems to be the greater good.